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SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE EXISTENTIAL FORCE OF
ROMAN LAW IN THE EARLY HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES*
MITCHELL FRANKLINt,

I.
xcept in Louisiana and in Puerto Rico the United States has been
dominated by uncodified Anglo-American common law as distinguished from the modern Roman law which, obtains elsewhere in
a greater part of the world, including Ibero-America and Qu6bec. But it
is correct to write that there has been a "History of American Roman
and Civil Law."'
In 1942 the writer discovered among the papers of the Depart-:
ment of State collected in the National Archives the text of the projet.
of 1806 of the Territory of Orleans, that is, Louisiana, consecrating a
legal system founded, among other civilian sources, on the sixth-century

codification of Justinian. 2 The projet gave the force of law, to the corpus
juris in Latin and untranslated into English. ' Moreover, the projet of
1806 not only precipitated a confrontation between Anglo-American
common law and Roman law, but also a confrontation between the
Romanist, bourgeois French civil code of 1804, the so-called Code
Napoleon, and the Romanist, feudal and colonial Spanish system, based,
largely on a collection of medieval civil codes:
Section 1.1 of the text of the projet of 1806 justified'the proposed
con ecration of the materials of Justinian because "[t]he roman Civil
code" was "the foundation of the spanish law, by which this 'country"*
* Paper prepared for the II Congreso interamericano de derecho romano of the
Seminario de derecho romano de la facultad de derecho de la Universitad nacional
aut6noma de MWxico, July 17-21, 1972, in coordination %vith,
the Associaci6n .interamericana de derecho romano, with seat at the Universidad de Paraiba, Joao Pessoa, Brasil.
Dr. Guillermo Floris Margadant of Mexico is presidente of'the' comite ejecutivo.
t Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, 'State' University of New York at
Buffalo; Professor Emeritus, Tulane University. A.B., Harvard University, 1922;, LL.B.,
I
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1925; S.J.D ., 1928.
1. Franklin, An Important Document in7 the History of American Roman andCivil Law: The de la Vergne Manuscript, in A REPRINT OF MOREAu-LIsLiT's CoPY
61 A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE TERIRORY-OF ORLEANS (1808)
CONTAINING

MANUSCRIPT

REFERENCES TO

ITS

SOURCES AND

OTnER CIVIL LAWS orm

THE SAME SUBJECTS 527 (2d Printing 1971).

2. Franklin, The Place of Thomas Jefferson in the Expulsion of Spanish Medieval
Law from Louisiana,16 TUL. L. REV. 319 (1942).
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was governed before its cession to France and to the United States ....
Thus, the Romanist feudal projet of 1806 was not only directed against
Anglo-American common law but against the bourgeois French code
civil of 1804.
The ideological struggle between the French Romanist bourgeois
forces and the Spanish Romanist feudal forces was fully as intense as
the struggle of both against Anglo-American common law. But in this
struggle both Romanist forces claimed to represent the eighteenthcentury Enlightenment. In the Preliminary Report of the Code Commissioners Dated February 13, 1828, which relates to the Louisiana
civil code of 1825, Edward Livingston, of New York and Louisiana, and
Moreau-Lislet, of Louisiana, described the French code, civil of 1804
as "the Napoleon Code, that rich Legacy which the expiring Republic
gave to France and to the world ... a system approaching nearer to
''4
perfection than any which preceded it.
In 1814, the de la Vergne

manuscript, which relates to the so-called Louisiana Digest of 1808, likewise described the legislation which culminates in the thirteenth-century Spanish Partidasas "a general code of laws, which might remedy
the abuses of the feudal laws ....-5The implication seems to be that as
the Partidashad the same anti-feudal mission as the code civil frangais,
it could be received instead of the latter. Nevertheless, the Partidas
represent the feudal law of feudal social relations. Livingston' theref~ore
condemned not only English common law, but in due time also Spanish feudal law. "As the legislation of which I am giving a partial review
was made in the thirteenth century," Livingston said of the Partidas
(which had provoked him into preparing his modern criminal code),
"it is not surprising to find that astrology, witchcraft and incantations,
love-powders and wax images make a figure in it."
The full text of the projet of 1806 is as follows:
An Act
declaring the laws which continue to be inforce in the
Territory of Orleans, and authors which may be recurred
to as authorities within the same.
Whereas by the effect of the reiterated changes which the govern3. Id. at 324.
4. Livingston, Moreau-Lislet, & Derbigny, Preliminary Report of the Code Commissioners Dated February 13, 1823, in 1 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVS lxxxv, lNxxix (1937)
[hereinafter cited as Livingston].
5. Franklin, supra note 1, at 532.
6. Id. at 529.
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ment of this Territory has undergone, the divers matters which now
composed its judiciary system, are in some measure, wrapped in obscurity, so that it has become necessary to present to the citizens the
whole of those different parts, collected together by which they may
be guided, whenever they will have to recur to the laws, untill the
Legislature may form a civil code for the Territory; and whereas
by the 11th section of the act of Congress, intitled "an act dividing
Louisiana into two Territories and providing for the temporary government thereof" passed the 22d march 1804, and by the 4th section
of the act of the said Congress, intitled "an act further providing
for the government of the Territory of Orleans" it is said, that the
laws which shall be inforce in the said Territory, at the commencement
of the said acts, and which shall not be contrary to the dispositions
thereof, shall continue to be in force untill altered, modified or repealed by the Legislature of the Territory.
Sect. 1st. Be it therefore declared by the legislative Council and the
House of Representatives of the Territory of Orleans in general assembly convened, that by virtue of said dispositions, the laws which
remain in force, and those which can be recurred to as authorities
in the tribunals of this Territory, save the changes and modifications
which may have already been made by the Legislatures of the said
Territory, save also whatever might be contrary to the constitution of
the United States, to the laws of the federal government which have
been extended to the said Territory by Congress, and to the acts of the
said Congress which direct the present governement of the said Territory, and save therefore the modifications, which necessarily result
from the introduction which the act of the 22d march 1804, has made
into the said Territory of the two most important principles of the
judiciary system of the common law, to wit, the writ of habeas corpus,
and the trial by jury, are the laws and authorites following, to wit:
1. The roman Civil code, as being the foundation of the spanish' law,
by which this country was governed before its cession to France and
to the United States, which is composed of the institutes, digest and
code of the emperor Justinian, aided by the authority of the commentators of the civil law, and particularly of Domat in his treaty of the
Civils laws; the whole so far as it has not been derogated from by the
spanish law; 2. The spanish law, consisting of the books of the recopilation de Castillaand autos acordadosbeing nine books in the whole; the
seven parts or partidas of the king Don Alphonse the learned, and
the eight books of the royal statute (fueroreal) of Castilla; the recopilation de indias, save what is therein relative to the enfranchisement of Slaves, the laws de Toro, and finally the ordinances and royal
orders and decrees, which have been formally applied to the colony of
Louisiana, but not otherwise; the whole aided by the authority of the
reputable commentators admitted in the courts of Justice.
Sect. 2. And be it further declared, that in matters of commerce the
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ordinance of Bilbao is that which has full authority in this Territory,
to decide all contestations relative thereto; and that wherever it is not
sufficiently explicit, recourse may be had to the roman laws; to Beawes
lex mercatoria, to Park on insurance, to the treatise of the insurences
by Emorigon, and finally to the commentaries of Valin, and to the respectable authors consulted in the United States.

John Watkins
Speaker of the house of Representatives
Jean Noel Destrehan
7
President of the Legislative Council
The proposed legal system of 1806 was immediately vetoed by the
territorial governor, Claiborne, who opposed all types of Roman law,
because he desired to receive the Anglo-American judge-made common law into Louisiana. The situation thus precipitated was so tense
that President Jefferson planned, as part of a general solution, to settle
a border army of thirty thousand soldiers on the right bank of the
Mississippi near New Orleans. In view of the crisis thus produced, the
adoption of the Civil Code of 1808 about two years later must, in a
limited sense, be regarded as a veritable social upheaval, for this code
was based essentially on the materials produced in France by the antifeudal French revolution. However, the Code of 1808 left slavery as
secure as ever.
This veering about from the Spanish medieval law in 1806 to the
French anti-feudal law in 1808 possesses great importance, not only in
the legal history of the United States, but also in the legal history of
the Latin nations of the western hemisphere. In subsequent decades
most of these nations repeated and amplified the legal history of Louisiana, for most of them also extirpated the Spanish feudal and colonial
political and legal regimes, replacing them by political constitutions
derived from Thomas Jefferson and by legal systems based on the
bourgeois code civil frangais.
Behind the above-mentioned complex ideological struggles in
Louisiana between Roman law and Anglo-American common law and
between French bourgeois Roman law and Spanish feudal Roman law,
the reality was that of culture struggle, of Louisiana slavery and of
Napoleonic imperialism. Because bourgeois production and the world
market everywhere required slavery in the colonial world certain
bourgeois forces in Louisiana were willing to support the bourgeois
Romanist code civil of the French metropolis supplemented, as in7.

Franklin, supra note 2, at 323.
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deed it was, by texts maintaining slavery. Moreover, the productive
possibilities envisaged by such bourgeois Romanist forces in Louisiana
also were founded in part on development of the steamboat by Fulton
and monopoly which came to relate thereto. Fulton became closely
allied with Edward Livingston, the New York-Louisiana Romanist
jurist, who together with Moreau-Lislet ultimately was the most important legal force in the history of Louisiana. On the other hand, the
bourgeoisie of the French metropolis, who had formulated the French
civil code were, so far as Louisiana was concerned, supporters of the
penchant hispanophile of Napolbon and Talleyrand. Because of bourgeois imperialist interest Napoldon and Talleyrand struggled in the
colonial world not for their own bourgeois Romanist code civil but for
Spanish feudal Romanist law.
II.

The defeated projet of 1806 was followed by the promulgation of
the so-called "Digest" or Civil Code of 1808. In 1941, the writer said:
"Mr. Charles E. de la Vergne and Mr. Pierre de la Vergne possess an
unpublished manuscript in which Moreau-Lislet gave, in detail, the
exact legal sources for the various articles of the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1808. ''8 For many years thereafter Mr. Louis V. de la Vergne has been
the chief force concerned with the de la Vergne manuscript, which was
dated 1814. In 1958 the writer said:
In the future it is prerequisite to scholarly work relating to the Louisiana Civil Code that resort be made to the de la Vergne manuscript.
It may also be mentioned that it is a highly valuable document relating to the history of Roman law in the new world.... It consists of
a preface . . .and of perhaps thousands of citations to Roman and

civilian legal sources, arranged pertinently to the successive articles
of the bilingual (French and English) Louisiana Digest or Civil Code
of 1808. [I]t may be assumed that the manuscript was prepared about
fourteen years after the publication of the French projet of the Year
VIII (1800) and about a decade after the promulgation of the
French Civil Code in 1804.9
The writer continued:
Nevertheless, the most marked characteristic of the manuscript is the
omission of reference to the texts of what both Edward Livingston and
8. Franklin, Libraries of Edward Livingston and of Moreau-Lislet, 15 TUL. L.

REv. 401, 403-04 n.10 (1941).
9. Franklin, An Important Document in the History of American Roman and
Civil Law: The de la Vergne Manuscript, 33 TUL. L. REv. 35 (1958).
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Morean-Lislet called in 1823 "... the Napoleon Code, that rich
legacy which the expiring Republic gave to France and to the world
...
a system approaching nearer to perfection than any which preceded it." Indeed, Domat, who flourished before the French Revolution, is the only French name mentioned in the preface of the de la
Vergne manuscript.10
In a footnote the writer said: "Pothier, who also flourished before the
French Revolution, is mentioned in the list of abbreviations (explications du abreviations)."11 Both Domat and Pothier influenced the redaction of the code civil after the revolution. In the main part of his
paper the writer proceeds to observe that
[t]herefore, as the major sources collected in that manuscript are not
those of the modem French law, which had introduced the law of
the post-feudal world, but those taken from medieval Spanish and
ancient Roman law, a crisis is disclosed. The nature of this crisis
may be understood by recalling the projet for a Louisiana code proposed in 1806, which was ultimately vetoed amidst great excitement .... The projet of 1806 and the manuscript under consideration
therefore both seek to direct Louisiana toward the Spanish feudal
law and away from the bourgeois French Civil Code of 1804. Behind this struggle are the opposed ideas of Jefferson and of Napoleon
and Talleyrand. Jefferson had in mind the ending of slavery within the
Louisiana Purchase and the introduction of the force of the French
Enlightenment. But after the 18 brumaire Talleyrand had oriented
Napoleon toward support of slavery and toward imperialism, one
Western hemispheric aspect of which was a "penchant hispanophile
on the subject of Louisiana." Hence, Jefferson's thought required the
introduction into Louisiana of the French Civil Code; and Talleyrand's thought required the exclusion from Louisiana of the French
Civil Code and the acceptance of Spanish medieval law. The writer
12
of the de la Vergne manuscript is aware of the crisis.

The materials mentioned in the de la Vergne manuscript are
similar to those consecrated in the vetoed projet of 1806, that is, the texts
of Justinian and of Spanish feudal law. But there is a most important
difference between the projet of 1806 and the de la Vergne manuscript
in that the materials which had been given the force of law in the
projet of 1806 are described in the de la Vergne manuscript as "having
13
some relation" to the "Digest of the laws of this state.'
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id. at 36 n.3.
Id. at 36.
Franklin, supra note 1, at 531.
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The' theme which now emerges urgently is whether the activist
feudal materials presented in the de la Vergne manuscript are juridicially designed to "overcome" as "enemy" 14 the activist Digest of
1808 and to accomplish what the vetoed projet of 1806 did not accomplish and thus to veer feudal Romanist defeat into victory. The theme
is whether' feudal Romanist materials mentioned in the de la Vergne
manuscript are an incognito of a feudal Romanist legal system. The
probldmatique is what Hegel in another connection described in his
System der Sittlichkeit as "different laws (Rechte) " coming into "collision."'I5 On both sides there is "risk of struggle" and "risk of death."",
The phrase "some relation" stated in the de la Vergne manuscript
between the activistDigest of 1808 and the activist materials indicated
in the manuscript, understood profoundly, that is, understood as
mobiles or as Beweggrund, signifies that the de la Vergne manuscript
has established, rival, contradictory, activist legal orders, the bourgeois
legal order consecrated by the promulgated, codified, enacted texts
of 1808, and the feudal legal order, unpromulgated and secreted in the
sIo-called sources. As the two legal orders, one bourgeois and the other
feudal, are both Romanist, there seems to be some kind of a simulated
identity or unity or "some relation" between them, although they reflect hostile social structures, as the French revolution in truth had
shown. The truth' of the antagonism between the two Romanist legal
orders is in the rival social structures and the untruth is in the ideology
of "some relation" obtaining between Romanist legal regimes. "Difference in relation," Hegel says in System der Sittlichkeit, is "enemy,"
"enemy of the Volk."'17
Because there is "some relation" stated in the de la Vergne manuscript between the activist Romanist bourgeois promulgated Code of
1808 and the activist Romanist feudal unpromulgated materials indicated in that manuscript, the de la Vergne manuscript is "dualistic."
Such "dualism" connotes that the de la Vergne manuscript consecrates
Kantian antinomies.
In The Philosophy of Law, published in 1796, Kant presents his con14. G. HEGEL, SYSTEM DER SITTLICRKEIT 58 (2d ed. G. Lasson ed. 1923). On
the accuracy' of this writing, see 2 G. HEGEL, WERKE 584 (Suhrkamp ed. 1970).
15. Id. at 74.
16. Id. at 58.
17. Id.

Hegel's discussion here passes later into his discussion of the terror
MIND 599 (2d ed.

of the French revolution. See G. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF
J. Baillie transl. 1931). See generally GLOCKNER, EL CONCEPTO
HEGELIANA (G. Margadant transl. 1965).

EN LA FILOSOFIA
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siderations relative to "collision of duties." This may be briefly mentioned. Kant says that
two opposite Rules cannot be objective and necessary at the same
time .... Hence a Collision of duties and Obligations is entirely inconceivable .... There may, however, be two grounds of Obligation

...connected with an individual under a Rule prescribed for himself,
and yet neither the one nor the other may be sufficient to constitute
an actual Obligation... and in that case the one of them is not a Duty.
If two such grounds of Obligation are actually in collision with each
other, Practical Philosophy does not say that the stronger Obligation
is to keep the upper hand... but that the stronger ground of Obligation is to maintain its place. 18
This hints at theory of social mobiles or social causa. Then Kant discusses "Natural and Positive Laws," saying that "An External Legislation, containing pure Natural Laws, is... conceivable; but in that case
a Previous Natural Law must be presupposed to establish the authority of the Lawgiver by the Right to subject others to Obligation
through his own act of Will."'19 Then Kant, as a jurist, passes to his
theory of subjective "Maxims" and later to his moral theory of "The
Categorical Imperative." Of this as an activist he writes:
And we may well wonder at the power of our Reason to determine
the activity of the Will by the mere idea of the qualification of a
Maxim for the universality of a practical Law, especially when we are
taught thereby that this practical Moral Law first reveals a property
of the Will which the Speculative Reason would never have come
upon either by Principles a priori, or from any experience whatever;
and even if it had ascertained the fact, it could never have theoretically
established its possibility. This practical Law, however, not only discovers the fact of that Property of the Will, which is FREEDOM,
but irrefutably establishes it. Hence it will be less surprising to find
that the Moral Laws are undemonstrable, and yet apodictic, like the
mathematical Postulates; and that they, at the same time, open up
before us a whole field of practical knowledge, from which Reason,
on its theoretical side, must find itself entirely excluded with its
speculative idea of Freedom and all such ideas of the Supersensible
generally.
The conformity of an Action of the Law of Duty constitutes its
Legality; the conformity of the Maxim of the Action with the Law
constitutes its Morality . .

.

. On the other hand, the Principle of

Duty is what Reason absolutely, and therefore objectively and uni18. I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
19. Id. at 33.

LAW

32 (W. Hastie transl. 1887).
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versally, lays down in the form of a Command to the individual, as
20
to how he ought to act.
The Kantian idea of law justifies the activism or freedom of the
jurist to choose among possibilities, that is, in the de la Vergne manuscript to choose between the bourgeois Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 and
the feudal materials in the de la Vergne manuscript. But it was not
necessary that Moreau-Lislet follow Kant. It would have been sufficient
for him to be aware of the theory of natural law of Malebranche or
French Physiocratic jurists.
Hegel showed that the activism of Kantian dualism or Kantian
antinomy justified deplacement, equivocation, duplicity, hypocrisy or
what Hegel called Verstellung or shifting. This may be briefly shown.
In The Phenomenology of Mind, published in 1807, Hegel says that
The moral attitude is, therefore, in fact nothing else than the developed expression of this fundamental contradiction in its various aspects.
It is-to use a Kantian phrase which is here most appropriate-a "perfect nest" of thoughtless contradictions. Consciousness, in developing
this situation, proceeds by fixing definitely one moment, passing thence
immediately over to another and doing away with the first. But, as
soon as it has now set up this second moment, it also "shifts" (verstellt)
this again, and really makes the opposite the essential element. At the
same time, it is conscious of its contradiction and of its shuffling, for
it passes from one moment, immediately in its relation to this very
moment, right over to the opposite. Because a moment has for it no
reality at all, it affirms that very moment as real; or, what comes to the
same thing, in order to assert one moment as per se existent, it asserts
the very opposite as the per se existent. It thereby confesses that, as a
matter of fact, it is in earnest about neither of them. The various moments of this vertiginous, fraudulent process we must look at more
2
closely. '

An important element in Hegel's Philosophy of Law is condemnation
of the legal history and legal theory of Verstellung, ddplacement or

irony.
Because the exact and activist "posited" so-called sources given in
the de la Vergne manuscript and the exact and activist formulated
texts of the Louisiana Digest of 1808 may exchange places and force,
each is as inexact or its own negation as it is exact. Each active, exact pole
20. Id. at 34.
21. G. HEGEL, TnE PHENOATENOLOGY OF MIND 629-30 (2d ed. J. Baillie transl.
1931). See Franklin, The Kantian Foundations of the Historical School of Law of
Savigny, 22 Rav. JUR. U.P.R. 64, 74, 87 (1952).
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of such antinomy is ironical because its activity or Tiitigkeit connotes
that it may also become its other. Because of its activity the good faith
of each pole, as perhaps Sartre might say, also is the bad faith of each
pole. The "positivity" of each pole bears within it the negativity of each
and also new "positivity." If the activist so-called source, seemingly
feudal, "plunders," seizes, appropriates or alienates the activist bourgeois text, the latter becomes a feudal force. If the activist, so-called
source, seemingly feudal, is "plundered," seized, appropriated or alienated by the activist enacted bourgeois text, it acquires the force of. a
bourgeois source.
If the enacted text and the so-called source may be "plundered"
or seized by its other, its other to which it has "some relation," it is
merely formalistic or abstract to classify (with several mechanistic or
undialectical degrees of classification, as has been done) the texts and
the so-called sources merely ideologically. As things-in-themselves the
activist materials classified juridically or ideologically become deactivated, that is, seemingly deprived of their historical motion or force.
If the above discussion is correct, there are two tasks. One task is
to discover which activist social structure is strong enough to overcome
or to "plunder" its rival. The second task is ideological. This is to master the activist legal ideology, legal methodology and legal instrument
of mediation by which the triumph of the stronger social structure
may be juridically justified and even acknowledged or recognized by
the other social structure. This states the profound intentionality or
mobile of the de la Vergne manuscript, the aim of which is to overcome
by legal method the bourgeois Digest of 1808 by means of the system
of legal materials set out in the manuscript. Thus the defeat of the
projet of 1806 would be negated.
Behind the mask or incognito of the ideology of natural law there
was at hand the existential possibility through legal method for the
alienation, appropriation or "plundering" of the Digest of 1808 by
the feudal Romanist-Spanish materials set out in the de la Vergne
manuscript. Because of the presence of the promulgated Digest of 1808
the hegemony of the ideology of the mask of natural law over the
positive law had to be justified as a certain kind of equity or of paralaw. The history of equity or of paralaw appears not only in ancient
Roman law, in feudal Roman law, but with opposed sense in bourgeois
Roman law after the French revolution. Its role in the history of AngloAmerican law need not be forgotten. In 1951 the writer said:
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The mission of equity may be that of overcoming the existing or the
strict positive law. However, the force of such negative equity is not
a mere destruction or cancellation of the existing strict law. The rival
legal systems seem to "co-exist" within the state, each presupposing
and yet opposing the other. However, the rivalry between such "parallel" systems is an illusion, if negative equity has the means of veering
and of interpenetrating the strict law. Such means exist,22although they
vary in each historic period and are appropriate thereto.
The method of equity or paralaw is the opposite of the method of legislation, which repeals defeated law. Negative equity, both Roman and
English, purports not to affect the existing law. The writer stated in
1951:
"Equity follows the law," says English equity. "The praetor cannot
alter the civil law," Buckland says of Roman equity. The older law is
said to remain intact in spite of the existence of the equitable institutions. Nevertheless, by means which are appropriate both technically
and ideologically negative equity overcomes, veers, and interpenetrates the positive law which it purports to accept. .

.

. Hence in

Roman law "[t]he formula does not deny the civil law right. The exceptio paralyses it." Buckland said of this that "[t]he new praetorian
actions, not known to civil law, may seem an infringement of civil
law rights, for the person is certainly deprived of a right or immunity.
But it is not so looked at: it is a supplement to the civil law, not
contradiction.1

23

The writer said, moreover, that
the hegemony of negative equity over the positive law was justified
on ideological grounds, which for historical reasons were regarded as
hierarchically superior to the positive law. Hence, the supremacy of
Roman equity was ultimately justified by natural law, and, indeed,
equity often has been identified with undialectical metaphysical natural
law.

24

In The Batture at New Orleans, published in 1810 and directed
against Edward Livingston, Jefferson mastered the dialectic of positive
law and equity. He perceived in such historical situation that there
exists unity between law and paralaw and within this unity there is contradiction and struggle. Hence Jefferson said that English equity
"tallied" with English common law and
22. Franklin, A New Conception of the Relation Between Law and Equity, 11
& PHENOMENOL. REs. 474 (1951).
23. Id. at 482.
24. Id. at 474.

PHIL.
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with no other body of law on earth. The Roman law has something
similar in its Jus Praetorium .... But to apply the Jus Praetoriumto
to our common law, or our chancery to the leges scriptae of the Romans, would be to apply to one thing the tally of another, or to mismatch the parts of different
machines, so as to render them incon25
sistent and impracticable.

Jefferson's habilite dialectique has been applauded by Barcia
Trelles. 26 Jefferson, who was the leader of the American Enlightenment, was oriented toward a French conception of Louisiana law, and
opposed to the penchant hispanophile of Napolon and Talleyrand.
The de la Vergne manuscript is not only an erudite document in
the history or the scholarship of Roman law, far beyond the level of
Anglo-American common law scholarship, but it is an important
-document in the history of the rivalry between dialectical and Kantian
thought, and it is significant as a partial anticipation of the theory of
possibility of twentieth-century philosophical existentialism.
The de la Vergne manuscript was reproduced and made public in
1968 and again in 1971. It is already resulting in a secondary literature,
none of which thus far seems to take account of the relation of the
manuscript to the defeated projet of 1806, nor to the social history or
"otherness" of the projet of 1806, of the Civil Code of 1808 or of the de
la Vergne manuscript itself. However, Pascal has casually indicated
certain interest in the role of natural law as masking or sanctifying the
feudal Spanish and Roman materials in the de la Vergne manuscript.2 7
III.

In his avant-propos to the de la Vergne manuscript, Moreau-Lislet
said that
[t]he purpose of this work is to make known, by written notes on the
blank pages attached to the Digest of the laws of this state, the texts
of civil and Spanish laws having some relation to them.
For this purpose, there will be found, besides the English text,
a general list of all the titles of the Roman and Spanish laws, which
relate to the materials treated in each chapter of the Digest, and be25. T.

The Batture at New Orleans [1810] in 18 THE WRITINGS OF
119-20 (Lib. ed. 1903).
26. Barcia Trelles, La doctrine de Monroj, 32 RECU IL DES COURS ACADEMIE DR
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 391, 439 (1930).
27. Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza, 46 TUL. L.
JEFFERSON,

THOMAS JEFFERSON

REV. 603, 625 n.57 (1972).
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side the French text, article by article, the citation of the principal laws
of the various codes from which the dispositions of our local statute are
drawn.
In citing the laws which have some relation to the various articles of the Digest, indications have not been limited to those which
only contain similar dispositions; but those laws have been added which
may present differences in prescription regarding the same matter,
may contain exceptions to the general principle therein conor which
28
tained.
Thus, it will be noticed that in the first and third paragraphs
(and in his title) Moreau-Lislet said that the materials cited had ideologically "some relation" to the Digest of 1808. But in the second paragraph he said that "for this purpose" he gave a general list of materials
which ideologically "relate" to the Digest of 1808. Through his play
on the abstract phrases "some relation" and "relation" Moreau-Lislet
was stating the superstructural dialectic of his enterprise, that is, the
dialectic of the unity-in-opposition required by the theme of the unityin-opposition of law and paralaw. The second paragraph, using the
word "relation" in masked fashion suggests ideological unity or identity
betwen the Digest of 1808 and certain materials indicated in the de la
Vergne manuscript. But the ideological phrase "some relation," used in
the first and third paragraphs and in the title suggests in masked
fashion contradiction between the Digest of 1808 and certain materials
of the de la Vergne manuscript. The words "[flor this purpose" in the
second paragraph suggests in masked form both the unity between
the Moreau-Lislet manuscript and the promulgated texts of the Digest
of 1808 ("relation") and the contradiction between the promulgated
texts of the Digest of 1808 and the de la Vergne manuscript ("some
relation"). Such superstructural unity-in-opposition between the Digest of 1808 and the de la Vergne manuscript will not be acknowledged
by undialectical scholars. Moreover, it is a disservice to say, as has been
done, that in all three paragraphs Moreau-Lislet employed only the
words "some relation," when in truth this phrase appears exclusively
in the first and third paragraphs and in the title. However, as the
phrase "some relation" suggests rivalry the error of translation will
be at this point ignored for the sake of further discussion.
As has been shown, in the second paragraph of the avant-propos
Moreau-Lislet said that he would cite "the principal laws of the various codes from which the dispositions of our local statute are drawn."
28. Franklin, supra note 1, at 531.
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The phrase, "our local statute," is a translation of the French words,
"notre statut local." It would be incorrect and even misleading to translate statut local as "local status" instead of "local statute," so that
Moreau-Lislet would be providing citations to civil and Spanish laws
which formerly and only formerly supplied the rules of local "status"
or local "condition" or local "state of affairs." This would mean, apparently without the use of temporal adjectives, that the de la Vergne
manuscript dealt with historically obsolete feudal and Roman materials
and hence that there would be no contemporary, immediate rivalry
between the feudal Spanish content of the de la Vergne manuscript
and the bourgeois French content of the texts of 1808. But although the
text of 1808 is essentially French, the de la Vergne manuscript, it must
be repeated, means that there is a rivalry or confrontation between the
Digest of 1808 and the materials of the de la Vergne manuscript. The
de la Vergne manuscript, as has been said, presents in more subtle form,
the same struggle between bourgeois Romanist and feudal Roman law
which resulted in the catastrophic defeat of the penchant hispanophile
in 1806.29

The title of the projet of 1806 said that it was "An Act declaring
the laws which continue to be inforce .

. . ."

The preamble referred to

the act of the Congress of the United States, in which it was said that
"the laws which shall be inforce in the said Territory, at the commencement of said acts ...

shall continue to be inforce until altered, modi-

fied or repealed by the Legislature of the Territory." Section 1 then
said that "the laws which remain inforce, and those which can be recurred to as authorities in the tribunals of this Territory ... are the

laws and authorities following, to wit: 1. The roman Civil code ...
aided by... Domat [and others] ...

the whole so far as it has not been

derogated from by the spanish law; 2. The Spanish law.. ." The enumeration of Spanish materials which follows in the projet of 1806 is virtually the same as the enumeration of Spanish materials in the de la
Vergne manuscript. 30 It would not be useful to show the relationship
more closely. It may be repeated that the penchant hispanophileof the
projet of 1806 reappears in more subtle form as the perchant his29. For details of the emergence, content and defeat of the projet of 1806, see
Franklin, supra note 2; Franklin, The Eighteenth "Brumaire" in Louisiana: Talleyrand
and the Spanish Medieval Legal System of 1806, 16 TUL. L. R.v. 514-61 (1942)
[hereinafter cited as Brumaire]. On the role of the Creoles before the French Revolution,
see Crioles in 14 OEUVRES DE DENIS DIDEROT 495 (1821).
30. The materials of the projet of 1806 have already been reproduced fully earlier in
this paper.
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panophile of the de la Vergne manuscript. The word "statut" in the de
la Vergne manuscript does not merely mean obsolete or past "status,"
past "condition,"' past "state of affairs." The de la Vergne manuscript
represents an activist legal system, which rivals the activist Digest of
1808. The de la Vergne manuscript is thus not merely antiquarian.
The word "statut," as used by Moreau-Lislet, is bound to the word
"Digeste" in the title of the Louisiana promulgation of 1808. The word
"digeste" does not have the English meaning of the word "digest." It
means not merely particularistically one juristic component in Justinian's 'corpus juris, but also is a comprehensive word, signifying the
totality of the corpus juris. The word, "pandects," a synonym for "digest," similarly enjoys a role indicating the totality of Roman law in
vigor. The-word "code" also has a particularistic as well as general significance. From a Romanist point of view it was not incorrect for the
promulgated Louisiana texts of 1808 to be described as "the digest
of the formulated law" as meaning a comprehensive or total system of
law ("le Digeste de la Loi Civile"), with a stated methodology for closing gaps in the system by means of article 4.21 of the preliminary title
(which today is article 21 of the Louisiana Civil Code). This means that
"Digest" of 1808,. "Civil Code of 1808," "our statute" (notre statut)
may be employed interchangeably.
However, this is a problem because the phrase used by MoreauLislet was not "notre statut," but "notre statut local." It is obscurantist
to suggest that this phrase connotes not "our local statute," but past
"local status," past "local conditions," past "local state of affairs." The
phrase "notre statut local" must be studied as a totality and as employed in Moreau-Lislet's second paragraph of his avant-propos, where
he wrote of "the principal laws of the various codes from which the local
dispositions of our local statute are drawn." The French word "statut"
and the English word "statute" enjoy an exceptionally prominent role
in the early history of Louisiana law. Saul v. His Creditors,31 which is
probably one of the most scholarly opinions in the history of American law, was concerned with statutes real and statutes personal of conflict of laws, as these emerged in feudal Roman law. Livermore's book,
Dissertations on the Questions Which Arise from the Contrariety of
the PositiveLaws of Different States and Nations,was published in.New
31. 5 Mart. (n.s.) 569 (1827). See 1 M. PLAINOL & G. R IPERT, TREATISE ON THE
pt. 1 no. 183 (12th ed. 1939), for a discussion of recent date in English.
See also note 53 infia.
CIVIL LAw
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Orleans in 1828 in response to Saul v. His Creditors. It is elementary
knowledge that Livermore's work which was "[t]he first American book
32
on conflict of laws reflected the views of the medieval statutists.
Nothing is gained by suggesting that "notre statut local" means
our "local status" and not local statute. These words all signify imperatively and hierarchically fixed or determined legal situation, and both
have the same origin in Latin and in French. However, in modern
French law the status or determinate position of a subject of law before
the law may not be described as status but as "dtat civil." In Roman law
such status was often described as "caput."' 3 As regards "notre statut
local," as used by Moreau-Lislet, the word "statut" relates to the sovereign or hierarchical determination of the being of the law itself, so
that it is hierarchically established or posited law, both in rank and in
content, that is, "statut" does connote statute.
In his Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law Berger writes that
"statutum" means "[a] law, an enactment. '3 4 There seems to be no English verb related to the English noun "statute." But in French there is
both the noun "statut" and the verb "statuer." As the verb "statuer"
may be translated as "to posit," the noun "statut" may be translated,
with elegance, as hierarchically enacted, established, posited or positive
law or statute, both in rank and in content. Reference may be made
here to elementary usage by Capitant. He says that "the legislator posits
(statue) for the future .... 35
At page 588 of his opinion in Saul v. His Creditors,Judge Porter
said of statutes real and statutes personal that
Holland and France appear to be the countries where the greatest
number of these questions have arisen, and where the subject has
excited most attention. The doctrine which they denominate that of
real and personal statutes, is not, as it might from the terms used,
be supposed, confined to written and positive law; but is applied,
also, to unwritten law or customs, by which the state or condition
of man is regulated ....
This suggests that the words "notre statut local" as words of hierarchy
may be related to the ideological hegemony of natural law.
The translation of German legal writing also may be considered.
32. R. CRAMTON &D.

CURRIE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 3 (1968).
33. Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law 714 in 43 TRANSL. AM. PHIL.
Soc. 333, 714 (1953).
34. Id. at 715.
35. H. CAPITANT, INTRODUCTION A L'ETUDE DU DROIT CIVIL 96 (5th ed. 1929).
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In paragraph 211 of his Philosophy of Law, Hegel, possibly- under the
influence of old Germanic ideas, says that law (Recht) is not law unless it is positioned or posited (gesetzt). There is a play here on the
two words for law which are found in many languages, though not in
English: lex and ius, loi and droit, Recht and Gesetz. The ideological
hierarchy, supremacy or subordination, or hegemony, within each pair
veers or shifts historically (to use Hegel's language). Knox's somewhat
faulty translation of Hegel may be noticed. "The principle of rightness
[law, Recht], becomes the law (Gestez) ," Hegel writes, "when, in its objective existence, it is posited (gesetzt), i.e., when thinking makes it determinate and makes it known as what is right and valid; and in acquiring this determinate character, the right becomes positive law in
general."3 6 Hegel then goes on to justify codification and to condemn
37
the "monstrous confusion" of English common law.
Before continuing with the problem of Moreau-Lislet's meaning of
"notre statut local," and of the relation of the noun "statut" to the verb
"statuer," it may not be amiss to recall that certain languages have two
verbs indicating being--one indeterminate being, the other determinate
being. This is important in studying Hegel and in confronting
Heidegger.
The import of the word "local" in Moreau-Lislet's phrase, "notre
statut local" as a totality and as used by him, justifies the translation
of "statut" as "statute." After his presentation of "statutum" as "a law,
an enactment," Berger continues, "statuta imperialia=-imperial constitutions."38 In his discussion of "Locus" in Roman law, Berger writes:
"Locus. Distinguished from FUNDUS (piece of land, estate) as a part
of a whole."3 9 Perhaps this may suggest that Moreau-Lislet hierarchically distinguished imperial statute from subordinate or local statute,
or like Porter, hierarchically distinguished natural law from positive
law.
In the next to the last paragraph of the avant-propos of the de la
Vergne manuscript Moreau-Lislet discussed the hierarchy of the Spanish
feudal materials in "the colonies of this nation, ' 40 that is, in Louisiana,
or perhaps in the total, enormous space of the original Louisiana
purchase, now partitioned into various states or territories. This was
36. G.

HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §

37. Id.
38. Berger, supranote 33, at 715.

39. Id. at 568.
40. Franklin, supra note 1, at 534.

211 (T. Knox transl. 1952).
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to become the problematiqud subsequently of the Missouri Compromise of 1820. The phrase "the colonies of this nation" thus suggest
the subordinate and partial position of each colonial statut within a
legal metropolis, empire (presumably French or Spanish) or any
greater sovereignty. It seems to condemn the notion of imperative subordination contained in the word statut as meaning obsolete "local
status," obsolete "local condition," obsolete "local state of affairs."
To what other regime or ideology could the Louisiana Digest of
1808 have been subordinated? The projet of 1806 acknowledged the
hegemony of the constitution of the United States and congressional
legislation. At the date of the de la Vergne manuscript Louisiana was
a state of the union. As the phrase "notre statut local" has hierarchical
meaning, was this an unstated reference to the state constitution and
the national constitution? Considering the struggle over the projet
of 1806 and also the military struggles involving Europe and the United
States, including New Orleans itself, does the phrase "notre statut
local" in 1814 have some esoteric political or philosophical meaning?
It seems likely that the phrase "notre statut local," as it does connote subordination, justifies the subordination of the formulated texts
of 1808 to natural law. Judge Porter had pointed to this.
Because of his high place as a scholar of Roman law, as an historian of feudal Roman law and as a theorist of conflict of laws, aspects
of Savigny's discussion in 1849 of the role and meaning of statut must
be brought forward.
(1). In volume 8 of his System des heutigen Rdimischen Rechts
which he devoted to conflict of laws, Savigny writes:
We find this origin of particular municipal laws as far back as the
time of the Roman Empire, whose separate communities not only had
the right of legislating for themselves before their union with the Empire, but did not thereby entirely lose that right, although they were
always subject to the new laws promulgated at Rome. It was entirely
owing to these municipal laws that the Roman jurists had occasion
to direct their attention to the questions we are here considering. They
are contrasted [Gegensatz], as particular laws, with the common [gemeine] law of Rome. Still more extensive and important were the
municipal laws [Stadtrechte]which in the middle ages developed themselves in almost every town in Italy, and which, as particular laws
[Particularrechte]were contrasted [gegen], not with the Roman law

only, but also with the Lombardic, both regarded as common [gemeine]
laws. It was in connection with them that the technical term [Kunstausdruck] Statutawas first used; and it was afterwards transferred to
1
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other countries;
and the doctrine of Statuta Personalia,realia, mixta
41
was added.
Thus Savigny holds that statut has hierarchical, technical, professional, esoteric meaning, which developed out of the history of feudal
Italian law and which passed into the international or general language
of Roman law. The word statut preserved such hierarchical, international, technical Romanist usage, even when used by French-speaking
jurists in Louisiana, such as Moreau-Lislet. In the language of American law schools, statut is a Romanist term "of art." In the language
of Savigny statut also has the technical force of "Kunstausdruck."
(2). Savigny devotes attention in his history of feudal Roman law,
an edition of which appeared between 1834-51, not only to "Statuten
der italienischenStiidte" or cities, but also to the statuta of many European universities. 42 In the eighth volume of his System des heutigen
Rdmischen Rechts, to which reference already has been made, Savigny
points out that a confrontation between general and particular law
may be between "positive law" and "custom." He writes: "Different
territorial laws within one and the same state have been noticed in a
former part of this work under the name of ParticularLaws, in contradistinction to the common law of such a state; and they may exist either
in the form of positive statutes [von Gesetzen] or in that of customs
[Von Gewohnheiten].."43 There is suggestion here (and difference, too)
of the problem discussed by Porter, already quoted. The de la Vergne
manuscript enjoys the role of establishing hierarchical rivalry, or subordination, between Spanish feudal Romanist law understood as natural law and the bourgeois French Romanist Civil Code or Digest of

1808. As is well known, Savigny condemned both natural law and codification. For him there could be no legitimate discussion of a hierarchial
relation between natural law and positive law.
(3). However, Savigny did perceive and acknowledge that the
feudal idea of the statut could involve hierarchy and confrontation
and subordination of certain other legal forces, but he was not able
to master the dialectic thereof. As an objective idealist, related to the
objective idealist outlook of Schelling, he could perceive law (Gesetz)
41. F.

SAVIGNY,

1880).
42. 3 F.

A

TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

65 (W. Guthrie transl.

SAVIGNY, GESCHICHTE DES ROMISOHEN REMHTS IN MITTELALTER

420-21,

513-14 (4te Aus. der 2ten Aus. von 1834); 8 id. at 338-41, and index references at 221.
43. F. SAVIoNY, supra note 41, at 64.
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here, custom (Gewohnheit) there; but he could not penetrate to the
reality of their unity-in-opposition. Some attention should be given
to Hegel's considerations of the dialectic of struggle between law
(Gesetz) and ethical custom (Sittlichkeit). In due course this will
appear.
(4). As has been suggested, the rivalry between the promulgated
French bourgeois Romanist Digest of 1808 and the unpromulgated
Spanish feudal Romanist de la Vergne manuscript, presented by
Moreau-Lislet, involves the further question of the sovereignty of the
United States in Louisiana, that is, the problem of subordination presented by Moreau-Lislet's phrase, "notre statut local." In effect, Savigny
also addresses himself to this matter in the eighth volume of his System
des heutigen Rdmischen Rechts, the volume devoted to conflict of laws.
Particular laws, Savigny writes, ".

.

. differ greatly in their historical

origin, as well as in the limits assigned by it to their authority. The
most important instances of such laws during the subsistence of the
German empire, arose from the relation of the individual German
states to the empire embracing them all."' 44 In a footnote to this Savigny
adds: "A similar relation, yet not quite the same, existed among the
little sovereign states composing the United Netherlands, which were
not united, like the German states, by a common supreme government
and legislation. By the cases of collision which very often arose there,
the jurists of Holland ... were led to give great attention to this sub-

ject. The relation of the free states of North America is similar." The
importance of this in connection with the matters discussed in this
essay is obvious. Savigny wrote this without knowledge of Moreau-Lislet,
probably without knowledge of Livermore, but with great knowledge
of Story.
What already has been mentioned concerning the "dualism" or
"parallelism" of the formulated law of 1808 and the paralaw of the materials set forth in the de la Vergne manuscript must be pursued further. The subordination of the French bourgeois Digest of 1808 to the
materials of Roman and feudal Spanish law, which, because of the de la
Vergne manuscript, were an ideological unity of opposites, was a possibility and only an existential possibility, unless the hispanophile
jurist could in effect appropriate, alienate, seize or "plunder" the formulated materials of 1808. This means that through legal method such
jurist might determine the conflict of such legal materials. Roman law
44. Id. at 65.
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has had a history of approximately twenty-five centuries of activist legal
method. Although these materials were not studied comprehensively
until Savigny in 1840, the possibility of subjective interpretation was
understood earlier. In A Treatise on Man, Helv~tius in 1773 wrote
that "[w]hen any one is the interpreter of a law, he changes it at his
pleasure, and at length becomes the author of it."4 r, This means that
the jurist enjoys the role of the external mediator or unhistoric prince,
whose activity is to choose among his possibilities, here the Romanist
Digest of 1808 or the materials or so-called sources suggested in the
materials set forth in the de la Vergne manuscript, understood as ideological unity-in-opposition.
Because of the power of the external mediator or unhistoric prince
the promulgated code of 1808 may be veered into projet and the projet
of the materials set forth in the de la Vergne manuscript may be veered
into positive law. The hegemony of the Digest of 1808 or of the materials or so-called sources indicated in the de la Vergne manuscript
is each a possibility dominated by the possibility or freedom of the
methodology of the jurist. If both the formulated Code of 1808 and the
materials in the de la Vergne manuscript are projets, such projets and
their force are determined by the existential projet of the juridical
methodology of the jurist as the external mediator or unhistoric prince.
For the time being the question, whether the methodological projet of
the jurist is controlled by the projet or mobile of social structure itself,
will be put only temporarily to one side. In the struggle of the Enlightenment against feudalism, the struggle to regain lost rationalism,
understood as natural law, the unhistoric prince or external mediator
had been introduced by the mechanistic Enlightenment to educate or
to teach rationalism, through law, that is, through posited natural law
(usually codification). Diderot and Helv~tius held that the magistrature enjoyed such rationalist power. In the face of Bourbon weakness
the French Physiocratic jurists, primarily Mercier de la Rivi~re, had
justified the hegemony of the magistrature as a reflection of economic
structure of society. They were the founders of economics and related
their theory of natural law and of the role of the magistrature to their
economic theory. The existential projet of the jurist itself is controlled
by the projet or mobile of the social structure and this means, so far as
the ideological parallelism or "dualism" of the Code of 1808 and the
materials in the de la Vergne manuscript are concerned, that the existen45. 2 HELViTIUS, A TREATISE ON MAN 150 (W. Hooper transl. 1810).
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tial projet of the jurist concerns the rivalry in Louisiana between
French bourgeois and Spanish feudal legal systems or projets of systems.
But, as has been said, this required that the materials of the de la
Vergne manuscript be masked as natural law in order to confront the
formulated Code of 1808. As also has been said, this was accomplished
by Moreau-Lislet through his use of the phrases "some relation" and
"relation." Historically such "some relation" and "such relation" obtained because the texts of both were Romanist and antagonistic. Philosophically such "some relation" and such "relation" obtained because
each reflected natural law, an idea that, as has been suggested, MoreauLislet indicated by his phrase "notre statut local." Both feudal and
bourgeois legal theory purported at that time to be natural law theory.
Indeed, Hegel conceived that the Enlightenment had "plundered"
feudal theory of the origin of law. Though feudal theory of natural
law was in truth philosophically idealistic and bourgeois theory of natural law was in truth philosophically materialistic, as Hegel well knew,
in his Phenomenology of Mind, he discussed bourgeois "plundering" of
feudal thought as a struggle over theory of property.
The most important judicial discussion of the irrepealability of
natural law in Louisiana was stated in Reynolds v. Swain,40 which was
decided in 1839. As this formulation seems to have been inspired by
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Fletcher v. Peck,47 decided in
1810, perhaps it may be ventured that in the United States generally
the mask of natural law could readily be put in 1814 over the materials
of the de la Vergne manuscript and over the Code of 1808 itself. The
concluding paragraph of the avant-propos of the de la Vergne manuscript may here be mentioned. "In regard to the dispositions of the
Roman law," Moreau-Lislet wrote, "they cannot be cited as laws in
Spain, but as written-reason. (See Murillo, Cursus iuris canonici, no. 23,
vol. 1, p. 9.)

",48

In the already noticed paragraph prior to the last paragraph of
the avant-propos Moreau-Lislet opens up the vista of the legal role of
customary law, to which as will be shown, the Digest of 1808 itself makes
reference, though as "received," that is, as bourgeois usage. "In the
Spanish tribunals of the Indies and of the colonies of this nation,"
Moreau-Lislet says:
46. 13 La. 193, 198 (1839). See Brumaire,supra note 29, at 551.
47. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 127 (1810).
48. Franklin, supra note 1, at 534.
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[T]he laws of the ricopilation des Indes should first of all control
everything that they provide for; in default of these laws, the laws of
the Rgcopilation de Castilla should rule, and finally the Partidas.But
in regard to the laws of Fuero Real and of Stile, it is necessary to estabthey can control, unless they have been included
lish their usage before
49
in the Rgcopilation.
Thus Moreau-Lislet suggests the possibility that the formulated Digest
of 1808 was also paralleled by customary Spanish feudal and colonial
materials or sources and the further possibility that the unhistoric
mediator-jurist, putting the mask of natural law or custom over the
Spanish materials, might veer such sources into positive law or, on
the contrary, veer the positive law of 1808, alternately, as Hegel's
discussion of Kantian shuffling, Verstellung or dtplacement, already discussed, shows.
Hegel's presentation of ddplacement appears in his Phenomenology
of'Mind. In his earlier considerations on the relation of natural and
positive law published in 1802-03, Hegel lays the foundation for his
criticism of Verstellung through his discussion of law and ethical custom (Sittlichkeit). Although Moreau-Lislet would not have known of
this earlier essay, Hegel indicates therein the Kantian and Fichtean
vocation of the de la Vergne manuscript with its establishment of a
confrontation between bourgeois French formulated Roman law and
the medieval Spanish Romanist materials. Hegel writes that the necessary unity is ". . . made formal. And the two determinations are posited
(gesetzt) as absolutes; consequently, with this they fall in their existence beneath ideality (Idealitiit), that inasmuch as both are mere possibility." 50 By "ideality" Hegel means that the antinomy collapses into
the antinomy of self-relation, or finiteness and particularism, or beingfor-self, 51 that is, into ideology. Hegel continues:
It is possible that law and duty, as determinate particulars, separated
from the subjects and the subjects separated from them, have reality;
however, it is also possible that both be connected. And it is absolutely
necessary that the two possibilities be separated and differentiated, so
that each founds its own science; the one, which concerns the unity of
the pure concept and the subjects, or the morality of activity: the
other, which concerns their non-unity or legality. And thus it is true
that if in this separation of ethical custom into morality and legality,
49. Id.
50. G. HEGEL, Ueber die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts,in

1 HEGEL, WERKE 322, 360 (Vollstindige Ausgabe, 1832).
51. G. HEGEL, THE LoGIC OF HEGEL 178 (2d ed. W. Wallace 1892).
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both of these become mere possibilities and even, for that reason,
both may be equally positive. The one is for the other indeed negative;
but both are like that. One is not the absolute positive, the other absolutely the negative; but each is both in relation to the other, and
thereby, first, both are only relatively positive, neither legality or morality is absolutely positive or truly ethical. And, then, because both, each
in this way is as positive as the other, both are absolutely necessary;
and the possibility that the pure concept and the subject of duty and2
law may not be in accord must be posited irrevocably and plainly.
53
This leads to Hegel's discussion of coercion.
As has been indicated, Hegel shows that Kant's thinking justifies
finiteness and particularism or "idealities" and ideologies. Such presentation controls Hegel's discussion of Kantian social antinomies and
explains Kantian deplacement, Verstellung, shuffling or bad faith, the
last as used today by Sartre. Hegel's presentation leads to writing that
the Louisiana civil code of 1808 and the content of the de la Vergne
manuscript fall into particularism and finiteness, though both were
masked or dissembled as natural law. Hegel says that

dualism, in putting an inseparable opposition between finite and in52. G. HEGEL, supranote 50, at 360.
53. Id. at 362, 366. Planiol-Ripert says of statutes real and statutes personal that
"[T]he problem arose from the clash between the municipal or provincial laws called
'statutes' and the Roman or Lombard laws, which held sway throughout the entire
country and were known as 'laws.'" Planiol-Ripert, supra note 31. Thus, Planiol-Ripert
also directs attention to the innerness of the struggle for hierarchy in law. In the confrontation between the Louisiana Digest of 1808 and the de la Vergne manuscript there
may lurk, in general, something of the role of intercessio in ancient Roman law and
of the role of cassation in and after the French revolution. See Franklin, Concerning the
Mission and Contemporary Force of Romanist "Intercessio," in 2 STUDI IN ONORE DI
VINCENZO ARANGIO-RUiz 269 (1952). See also G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY O RIGHT
[LAw] § 273 (T. Knox transl. 1952); G. HEGEL, supra note 50; G. HEGEL, SYSTE M DE
SITTLICHKEIT 74 (2te Aus., G. Lasson ed. 1923); Franklin, Concerning the Dialectic of
Romanist Tribunitial "Intercesso" During a Period of Social Ambiguity and Social
Irony, forthcoming. Of the situation in medieval Germany Huebner writes:
The rule, namely, became gradually recognized that the more special should
take precedence of the more general law ... As men were wont to express the
rule in a legal proverb: "Arbitrariness breaks town law, town law breaks
provincial law, and provincial law breaks general law." ("Willkiir bricht
Stadtrecht, Stadtrecht bricht Landrecht, Landrecht bricht gemein Recht").

In this predominance . .. of the local and special law, the persistent decentralization of German law found its clearest expression.
R. HUEBNER, A HISTORY OF GERMANIC PRIvATE LAW 22 (F. Philbrick transl. 1918). (The
translation has been altered by this writer.); See also R. SoHas, BUROERLICHES REOHT,
SYSTEMATiscHE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 66, 69 (2te Aus. 1913); H. PLANITZ, DEUTSOIES
PRIVATRECHT 5 (3te Aus. 1948).
Probably because of his feudal orientation, Savigny misquotes the material presented
by Huebner supra. See Savigny, System des heutigen Rdmischen Rechts, § 347, n.(g)
(1849).
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finite, fails to note the simple circumstance that the infinite is thereby
only one of two, and is reduced to a particular, to which the finite
forms the other particular... The being of the finite is made an absolute being, and by this dualism gets independence and stability ...
But it must not be touched by the infinite. There must be an abyss,
an impassable gulf between the two .... [T]he infinite of understanding, which is co-ordinated with the finite, is itself only
one of two
54
finites, no whole truth, but a non-substantial element.
The rivalry of the two finite natural laws, the two "idealities" or
ideologies necessitated, in the thinking of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, the external mediator, the unhistoric prince, the agility
of the legal method of the jurist-mediator. Hegel says that, after Kant,
Fichte ". . . founds a system, according to which, despite their separation, the concept and the subject of ethical custom both ought to be
reunited, yet exactly for this reason only in a formal and external
manner-and this relation is called compulsion." 55 Such external mediation is the weapon of the stronger or more violent force. Thus may
be uncovered the reality of the coercive role of the external mediatorjurist in the unity of rival, antagonistic natural law systems, each in
truth masked particularisms. Kant, too, masked the weapon of compulsion in his presentation, already set forth, that "...
Moral Laws are
undemonstrable,and yet apodictic . .."51
There existed forces in Louisiana which could be directed against
the penchant hispanophile of the de la Vergne manuscript. (1) Jefferson himself held that the law of Louisiana was and had been French
Romanist and not Spanish Romanist. 57 (2) Moreover, Livingston and
Moreau-Lislet himself deepened the attack on Spanish feudal legal
ideas when the scope of Roman law and Romanist sources as sources in
Louisiana was widened. The Romanist system of Louisiana, they later
said, had to take account of "Spanish Statutes, ordinances and usages,
Latin Commentaries, the works of French and Italian Jurists, and the
heavy tomes of Dutch and Flemish annotations ....
,,"58
What was ultimately felt to be important was the culture struggle against AngloAmerican law. In this sense Romanist legal history is important as a
prototype of national liberation struggle against certain imperialism.
However, this culture struggle in Louisiana was ironic because it was
54. G. HEGEL, supranote51, at 176.
55. Id. at 362.
56. I. KANT, supra note 18, at 34.
57. Brumaire,supra note 29, at 544 n.143.

58. Livingston, supra note 4, at Lxxxvii, xci.
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a struggle to maintain slavery within the United States. Paine therefore condemned the Louisiana culture struggle.5 9 Moreau-Lislet's own
politics remain to be discovered. At one time before coming to Louisiana he had been secretary to Toussaint l'Ouverture. Perhaps it may be
discovered that Napol6on explains his penchant hispanophile at the
time of the de la Vergne manuscript. On the whole Moreau-Lislet seems
identified with the pro-American politics of Governor Claiborne and
President Jefferson; and he was a Louisiana leader in the fight against
nullification during the period when Livingston was Jackson's secretary of state. 60 It does not seem too much to suggest that Moreau-Lislet,
Livingston, Roselius, and Pound have been the most brilliant American Romanists. (3) The most formidable bulwark against the force
of the de la Vergne manuscript is the Digest of 1808 itself. This text as
particularistic bourgeois text of natural law condemns the Spanish
particularistic, feudal materials of the de la Vergne manuscript as a
rival system of natural law. It excludes other external (in Hegel's sense)
natural law, save insofar as bourgeois natural law justifies the inner development of the Digest of 1808. This appears in article 4.21 of the preliminary title, which is taken immediately from the French bourgeois
projet of the Year VIII (1800). This text of legal method reads as follows: "In civil matters, where there is no express law, the judge is
bound to proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably
an appeal is to be made to natural law and reason, or received usages,
where positive law is silent." Article 4.22 of the preliminary title reads
as follows: "The judge cannot, in a criminal matter, supply by construction, any thing omitted in the law."
Elsewhere in this paper the historic role of equity in overcoming
law, of paralaw overcoming law, was discussed. Such equity is forbidden
by article 21. However, equity in the history of Roman law has also
enjoyed the role of justifying the development of the positive content
of the texts to solve the problem of lacunae or gaps in the texts consistently with the social structure reflected in the formulated law. This is
what article 21, following the bourgeois French projet of the Year
VIII (1800), accomplishes. This text as such excludes the force of the
"plundering" appropriative or alienating paralegal feudal materials
gathered in the de la Vergne manuscript.
Some French jurists seem to have opposed the proposed text of the
59. Brumaire, supra note 29, at 540.
60. Franklin, Libraries of Edward Livingston and of Moreau-Lislet, 15 TUL. L.
REv. 401, 403 (1941).
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Year VIII concerning equity on the ground that the reference to equity
would justify English negative equity, so that the French courts could
dispense with or negate the new code civil. But Portalis, orateur for
the government, answered that the equity consecrated under the new
regime was a positive or affirming equity and not a negative or dispensing equity.
"One of the orators has pretended," Portalis said, "that we are
giving the judges a power denied by the Constitution. 'I think,' he has
told us, 'that we have no tribunals of equity which may dispense with
the statutes. There is a court of equity in England; in Rome the praetor
was a judge of equity; in France the king had the right to give dispensation and the Parlemens often deviated from the letter of the statute.
But, among us the calling of the judge is confined to the faithful application of the statutes.' "
"All of these objections," Portalis answered, "establish nothing
against the article; they only prove that the article has not been understood."
"The author of the objection," Portalis continued, "would be
sound if we should allow the judges the liberty of putting natural
equity in place of positive law. Thus in Rome the praetor did not
apply the law when he believed it contrary to natural equity. He introduced the actions of good faith in order to escape the laws which had
established exact formulae for each action; in England the court of
equity and in France the courts of the sovereign often made law in
order to modify the laws; but this is not how this article works. Our
article only fits the cases where the law is obscure or insufficient and
the cases where there even is no law. In these several instances should
the judge surrender his calling or fulfill it?" 61

IV.
It already has been pointed out that Moreau-Lislet's veering during
his career may have been dialectical. This requires some discussion of
the contradictory social structures reflected in the particularism of the
hostile legal idealities or ideologies of the early legal history of Louisiana, including the bourgeois Digest of 1808 and the feudal materials
of the de la Vergne manuscript. The structural rivalry was the struggle
over slavery. President Jefferson, the leader of the American eighteenthcentury Enlightenment, intended the destruction of Louisiana slavery.
61. Discours de M. Portalis, orateur du gouvernement, pronounc6 dans la sean6e du
Corps IAgislatif du 23 frimaire, an X, 1 Locr6, La legislation de Ia France 480-81
(1827). See Franklin, Equity in Louisiana: The Role of Article 21, 9 TUL. L. R v.

485 (1935).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

It will be recalled that at the time of Jefferson's purchase Louisiana
meant the space of probably a million square miles. In part Jefferson
weakened slavery by partitioning this space into numerous states. In
Louisiana itself Jefferson actively sought to destroy slavery. This explains his conception that the Roman law of Louisiana had been feudal
French and should become bourgeois French. On the other hand,
Napoleon and Talleyrand, who intended the restoration and maintenance of slavery in Louisiana and in Ibero-America, at that time controlled by them, did not introduce the bourgeois code civil of the
French metropolis into this French colonial empire. The maintenance
of slavery in the colonial world explains the French penchant hispanophile of Talleyrand who probably regarded the transfer of Louisiana
to the United States as masking a deposit of Louisiana into the safekeeping of the United States. Because of the power of the bourgeois
French Enlightenment in the United States the defeat of the projet
of 1806 was a defeat for feudalism.
It is true that the Digest of 1808 and the Civil Code of 1825 maintained slavery and such was a defeat for the American Enlightenment.
But Marx pointed out before the American Civil War that American
slavery was the pedestal of world-wide bourgeois production. Bourgeois
productive possibilities were felt in Louisiana at a relatively early date.
Even the projet of 1806 legitimates certain commentators on commercial law. In this sense the projet of 1806 was closer to bourgeois interest
than the materials of the de la Vergne manuscript. As there was tremendous land speculation in Louisiana during the period under consideration certain Anglo-American common lawyers supported the
penchant hispanophile because of the incognoscibility of the feudal
Spanish Romanist materials. This, too, was the period of the adventures
of Aaron Burr and, later, of the battle of New Orleans. Fulton had invented the steamboat and had been absorbed by the family of Edward
Livingston, the greatest of the Louisiana Romanists. This conquest
had led to the struggle to create legal monopolies in various ports.
The bourgeois Romanist Civil Code of 1825, the history of which
goes back to 1823, succeeded the Digest of 1808. This signifies the end
of the struggle between the bourgeois code of 1808 and the feudal paralaw of de la Vergne manuscript. At this time the defeat of Jefferson's
intention to destroy Louisiana slavery was acknowledged by the Missouri
Compromise of 1820, weakening the interest of Louisiana slaveholders
'in Talleyrand's penchant hispanophile. Indeed, the Ibero-American
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world itself, through a series of revolutions, was destroying the feudal
penchant hispanophile and turning to the French bourgeois code civil.
Moreover, in 1823, the year of the report of Moreau-Lislet, Livingston
and Derbigny relative to the new bourgeois Louisiana Civil Code of
1825, the Monroe doctrine was announced. This proclamation meant
the United States had become strong enough to exclude certain forces,
including the penchant hispanophile, from intervening in internal
American life through the door of American federalism.
V.
As has been said, the commentaries which have thus far been published since the de la Vergne manuscript became publicly available
ignore the projet of 1806 and the social structure which gives meaning
to legal texts. This means that such work is abstract and formalistic. It
would not be sufficient today to discuss the BGB (German Civil Code
of 1900) without taking account of its successive meanings under the
empire, under the Weimar Republic, under the Nazi regime and under
BRD, and, above all, of its rival meanings today in the BRD and the
DDR. So, too, the French code civil, which probably has been the most
influential legal system in world history, has had an appropriate variety
of meanings over a course of almost two centuries.
As has been said, the natural law ideology of the Enlightenment
and of feudalism masked particularism. This particularism has been intensified, has become hopelessly abstract, in recent legal writing in
Louisiana, insofar as each text or article of the Louisiana Digest of
1808 is treated in isolation from other articles, and merely compared
with similarly isolated texts of the de la Vergne manuscript. Indeed, this
is the worst kind of Anglo-American legal scholarship, which knows
nothing of the organic and totality conceptions of modern Romanist
codification. The latter conceives that the meaning of formulated law
should be derived from the texts understood as a system of interrelated
and inter-penetrating formulations. If each text of the Louisiana Digest
of 1808 and of the materials of the de la Vergne manuscript is discussed
in total isolation the outcome is that such texts are Leibnizian windowless monads, requiring that their unity be established through preestablished harmony, the alienating role of which is similar to that of the
external mediator-jurist and the unhistoric prince mentioned earlier
in this paper. Even if there were Louisiana interest in the organic or
organized force of legal texts, Llewellyn, the redactor of the new Amer-
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ican Uniform Commercial Code, said that "no historian of today has
any business to stop with legal records." 62 Llewellyn's thought should
lead beyond any ideological fetters to social theory of law. It already
has been indicated that Hegel required "innerness" in his discussion of
the relation of natural and positive law, which fell into particularism
through lack of "innerness."
If the texts of the code are monadized or treated as things-in-themselves, they become nothingness or anythings through lack of interrelation. Thus, it becomes possible to hold, perhaps arbitrarily, that a
text of the Digest of 1808 is either feudal Spanish or bourgeois French,
especially if there are variations in formulation. Hence the controversy
which has developed as to whether the Digest of 1808 is itself not
bourgeois French but feudal Spanish, is essentially a controversy in
which decisions may conflict and may be ideological. It will not suffi6c
separately or in isolation to examine each text of the Digest of 1808,
classify it as French or Spanish, and then to count or to arithmeticlze
the count.
Moreover, the further weakness in such absolutely particularistic,
monadic method is that it considers all texts of the digest of 1808 as
equal in force, forgetting that there are certain texts which are parimount. Perhaps these may be called "mobile" or "Beweggrund" 6r
"'causa" or "presuppositional" texts, thus invoking thought of the
Physiocratic jurists or of Domat or of Hegel. Of course, the sixth-century texts of Roman law were Roman and neither French nor Spanish.
Furthermore, it may be mentioned that the history of Roman law,
feudal or bourgeois, has been that of an international legal science. In
this Roman and civil law, together with international law, differ from
other law. Again, it may be said here this signifies that the meaning
or the force of law of such abstract Romanist text is not a relationless
thing-in-itself, but struggles to get its meaning not only through othei
texts, but from the social structure which the text reflects. As a text bf
Roman law may be ancient, feudal or bourgeois, it gets its truth and
force from its social otherness. As has been said, the French civil code
has served not only bourgeois, but also feudal and semi-feudal social
regimes. Even if the texts of the Louisiana Digest of 1808 had bedn
firmly feudal Spanish, their meaning as feudal or as bourgeois would
62. Llewellyn, Book Review, 31 CoLum. L. REv. 729 (1931). In his essay on
Liaison before the French revolution, Diderot wrote of "the universal connection of all
things." 17 OEUVRES DEDENIS DIDEROT 120, 121 (1821).

EXISTENTIAL FORCE OF ROMAN LAW

be determined not by such texts as monads or as ideology, but by the
social structure or social otherness promulgating them.
Heidegger conceives of language as violence, but the violence of
language is social violence. It must be remembered that the presupposition of the de la Vergne manuscript is that even if the texts of the
Digest of 1808 are not feudal Spanish, the mission of the violence of the
language of the de la Vergne manuscript was, through legal method, to
im-pose Spanish feudal force on the formulated texts of the Digest of
i808. As has been shown, this is what Hegel called "coercion" or "constraint" in discussing the "dualist" legal ideas of Kant and Fichte. But
this force is true also of the Digest of 1808. The rival violences are rival
struggles.
If it is assumed that the texts of 1808 are often feudal Spanish
iexts, Wvhat the writer has just called its "mobile" or "causa" or "presuppositional" texts are bourgeois French. Louis de la Vergne, Esq.,
the active donor of the de la Vergne manuscript, Mrs. Nina Nichols
PThgh, "research assistant to Professor Robert A. Pascal of Louisiana
Stat e University, and Professor Robert A. Pascal himself, seem to believe that the problem of the derivation of the content of the Digest of
A08 as a system of monads has not been accomplished satisfactorily;
aid that the Digest should be studied by a commission of scholars,
despite the elaborate monadist study of the matter at another law
school. This is correct, provided the methodology of such commission
also takes account of the interrelationship of the texts of 1808 and of
the social structure of such code. Such fresh study, in assessing these
texts, should also acknowledge the hegemony of the mobile, causa, or
presuppositional texts. Furthermore, the commission should relate the
problem of such causa-texts to Kelsen's theory of the Grundnorm,which,
like Kant and Fichte, may have to be criticized because of what
Hegel called "externality," "separation" or what today may be called
"distance."
Perhaps some causa- or mobile-texts of the Digest of 1808 may be
mentioned. Reference already has been made to the importance of the
formulations in the Digest of 1808 relative among other things to legal
method. These materials, which constitute something of an aspect of an
eighteenth-century idea of a general part of the code, permeating its
entire determinate being, have already been somewhat referred to, in
particular article 4.21 of the preliminary title, dealing with lacunae
or gaps in the code. In large measure and in explicit words these articles
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derive from the projet of the Year VIII (1800). It may be mentioned
that this projet of the Year VIII may have been more valuable from an
educational or institutional point of view than the definitive French
code civil of 1804. This would be important in Louisiana which then
had no law faculties.
Article 1.2 of the preliminary title, among other things says that
"the law (La loi) " announces "rewards and penalties." Nothing could
be more bourgeois than these important words. In Characteristics,which
first appeared in 1711, Shaftesbury, whose tutor had been Locke, opened
the discussion which leads to the embourgeoisment of the idea of rewards and punishment. He in effect secularized the problem and removed it from the sphere of religion to the sphere of profane law. After
a biblical discussion, he writes that ". .

the heroic virtue of these per-

sons had only the common reward of praise attributed to it, and could
not claim a future recompense under a religion which taught no future
state, nor exhibited any rewards or punishments, besides such as were
temporal, and had respect to the written law. ' 6 3 In pursuing this
thought Shaftesbury, who more or less adumbrates the role of secularized theory of bourgeois rewards and punishments in confronting
the chilling or coercive effect of state terrorism, suggests the relation
of such theory to bourgeois, Anglo-American contract theory of "bargain" consideration; considers the relation of his theory to infamy
(important in understanding the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution); and anticipates the role of death or nothingness in
existentialist social death. Shaftesbury's thought passed to France
through Diderot. However, only that portion of Shaftesbury's presentation on rewards and punishments which touches the Louisiana Code of
1808 by suggesting bourgeois mobile or causa or Voraussetzung will be
here noticed. "Thus in a civil state or public," Shaftesbury writes,
we see that a virtuous administration, and an equal and just distribution of rewards and punishments, is of the highest service, not only
by restraining the vicious, and forcing them to act usefully to society,
but by making virtue to be apparently the interest of every one, so as
to remove all prejudices against it, create a fair reception for it, and
lead men into that path which afterwards they cannot easily quit. For
thus a people raised from barbarity or despotic rule, civilized by laws,
and made virtuous by the long course of a lawful and just administration, if they chance to fall suddenly under any misgovernment of
63. A.
ACTERISTICS

SHAFTESBURY, An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humor, in
68 (J. Robertson ed. 1964).
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unjust and arbitrary power, they will on this account be the rather animated to exert a stronger virtue in opposition to such, violence and
corruption. And even where, by long and continued arts of a prevailing tyranny, such a people are at last totally oppressed, the scattered
seeds of virtue will for a long time remain alive, even to a second
generation, ere the utmost force of misapplied rewards and punishments can bring them to the abject and compliant state of long-accustomed slaves. But though a right distribution of justice in a government be so essential a cause of virtue, we must observe in thiscase that
it is example which chiefly influences mankind, and forms the character and disposition of a people. For a virtuous administration is in a
64
.
manner necessarily accompanied with virtue in the'magistrate.
In A Treatise on Man, published in 1773, Helvdtius discussed "the
Moral Education of Man." The question is asked: "Supposing the laws
of nature to be dictated by equity, what means are there of causing
them to be observed, and of exciting in the minds of the people love of
their country?" The answer: "These are punishments inflicted for
crimes, and rewards assigned to virtues." The next question .is: "'What
are the rewards for virtues?" The answer: "Titles, hondurs, tli Public
esteem, and those pleasures of which esteem is the representative." Next
question: "What are the punishments for crimes? Sometimes death;
often disgrace, accompanied with contempt." The riext question relates
the problem of infamy (consecrated in the fifth amendment of 'the
United States Constitution) and of existential 'anguish before death ,
natural or civil, or before nothingness, to the 'theory of rewards and
punishments. The question is: "Is contempt a puinishmiient?" The answer: "Yes; at least in a free and well governed country. In such a!'
country the punishment of contempt is severe arid' dreadful;- it -is
capable of keeping the great to their duty; the fear of contempt renders'
them just, active, and laborious." 65
,
By means of the answer to the next question Helv6tius indicates.
that the theory of rewards and punishments is bourgeois cadsa- "or'
mobile- or Voraussetzung-theory.The question is:" "Justice ought doubtless to rule empires; it ought to reign by the laws. But are laws all cif the'
same nature?" The answer: "No: some of them may be said"to be invariable, and without them society cannot subsist, at 'least not happily!
"
sucl are the fundamental laws of property." 66

In his Discourses on Davila, published in 1790, John Adams, too,
64. Id. at 272.
65. 2 HELvfrxus, supra note 45, at 427.
66. Id. at 428.
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stated a bourgeois theory of rewards and punishments, and like Helvdtius, adumbrated the dialectic of bourgeois existential anguish or
nothingness in such theory.
Nature then has kindly added to benevolence, the desire for reputation, in order to make us good members of society.... Nature has sanctioned the law of self-preservation by rewards and punishments....
The same nature ... has imposed another law, that of promoting the
good, as well as respecting the rights of mankind, 'and has sanctioned
it by other rewards and punishments. The rewards in this case, in this
life, are esteem and admiration of others; the punishments are neglect and contempt; nor may any one imagine that these are not as
real as the others. The desire of the esteem of others is as real a want
of nature as hunger; and the neglect and contempt of the world,
as severe a pain as the gout or stone. It sooner and oftener produces
despair, and a detestation of existence; of equal importance to individuals, to families, and to nations. It is a principal end of government to regulate this passion, which in its turn becomes a principal
means of government. It is the only adequate instrument of order and
subordination in society, and alone commands effectual obedience to
reason, nor standing armies,
laws, since without it neither human
6
would ever produce that great effect. 7
In The Philosophy of Law, Kant in 1796, as an activist, indicates
that the bourgeois idea of "rewards" relates to the bourgeois structure
of society, that is, to bourgeois property. He says that "The juridical
Effect or Consequence of a culpable act of Demerit is PUNISHMENT
... that of a meritorious act is REWARD ...assuming that this Reward was promised in the Law and it formed the motive of the action.
The coincidence or exact conformity of conduct to what is due has no
juridical effect.-Benevolent REMUNERATION ...has no place in
juridicalRelations."68
3.2.4.40 of the Digest of 1808 stipulates that "substitutions and
fidei commissa are and remain prohibited." This is a basic bourgeois
accomplishment of the French revolution, putting an end to the pyramid structure of feudalism. It too, is a mobile-text. In 1789 Jefferson
from Paris sent Madison a document of Lafayette containing materials
of "declarations of rights," that is, materials relating to what was to
be the American Bill of Rights or second constitution. Lafayette's text
67. J. ADAMS, Discourses on Davila, in 6 THE WORKS O*FJOHN ADAMS 234 (1851).
68. I. KANT, supra note 18, at 38. On "reward and punishment," see D. DIDEROT
Ricompense in 19 OEUVRES DE DENIS DIDEROT 163 (1821); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 313-15 (1971); M. SCHELER, LE FORMALISME BN ETHIQUE 366 (M. de
Gandillac, transl. 1955); B. F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 51 (1971).
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was entitled "General Principles Relative to a Political State." Paragraph 14 said: "No substitutions." 69 Furthermore, in a later letter written by Jefferson from Paris to Madison in 1789, Jefferson also said that
the ". . . principle that the earth belongs to the living, and not to the
dead, is of very extensive application and consequences, in every country, and most especially in France. It enters into the resolution of the
questions Whether the nation may change the descent of lands holden
in tail?" 70 Jefferson's generation theory should be related to that of
Ortega y Gasset and of Werner Krauss.
However, the Digest of 1808 also has a mobile- or causa-text repudiating basic social ideas of French bourgeois law. Article 2279 of
the code civil is bourgeois because it guarantees the rapid circulation
or exchange of movables in the market. It says that "possession is equivalent to title." In the Digest of 1808 this is rejected and replaced with a
three-year prescriptive period for movables. This may be anti-bourgeois,
but it may also mean that in Louisiana the elliptical phrase, "possession is equivalent to title" was understood in the Roman law sense of
titulus in prescriptive law in general and not in the Roman law sense
of dominium or ownership. It must be said that although article 2279
is bourgeois, in that it insures confidence in the market of movables,
the French text of the legal formulation thereof was feudal. The Louisiana jurists could have been misled by the seemingly feudal force of
the doctrine and thus have repudiated it on the assumption that it was
feudal and not bourgeois. What is more likely, the repudiation of
article 2279 may mean that though Louisiana received bourgeois law, it
received it in terms of its own situation as a colonial supplier of raw,
agricultural materials, produced through slave labor, for instance, sugar
and cotton, prior to the entry of such products into the world market
through the port of New Orleans. If so, la possession vaut,itre might
not become a legal necessity until the specification of such raw materials in the bourgeois metropolis, which was centered outside of
Louisiana. It may be also mentioned that the fate of article 2279 in
the Louisiana civil codes shows that the articles of such codes cannot
be discussed as French or as Spanish in isolation from the codes as to69. Cited in Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method and its Implications for Republican Form of Government: Griswold v. Connecticut; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 40 TUL. L. REv. 487, 502 n.29 (1966).
70. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, September 6, 1789, in 15
TnE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 396 (J. Boyd ed. 1958). This letter, along with
materials involving Richard Gem, was collected under the title, The Earth Belongs in
Usufruct to the Living. See id.
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talities; thus, there are so many code exceptions to the repudiation of
article 2279 of the code civil in Louisiana that the exceptions virtually
restore article 2279 to the civil codes of Louisiana.71
VI.
The national history of the United States early in the nineteenthcentury justifies the thought that the Louisiana texts of 1808, despite
the penchant hispanophile of the de la Vergne manuscript, had French
bourgeois signification. Though the American revolution had broken
English political power it had not broken the force of English law.
There was a linguistic problem. The New York and Louisiana jurist,
Edward Livingston, was the spokesman for Romanist and civilian ideology in the United States and Jefferson, as has been indicated, was the
political leader of such tendency as the American spokesman for the
French Enlightenment. Cooper, an Anglo-American eighteenth-century
mechanical materialist philosopher, also becomes important as a jurist.
Because of the role of the civil law in Louisiana, it was possibly expected to overcome Anglo-American common law within the rest of
the United States. This could only happen if Louisiana Roman law
was bourgeois or French Roman law. Cooper translated institutional
aspects of the corpus iuris into English. This juridical tendency failed.
Moreover, as a philosophic materialist Cooper was overcome by the influence of German philosophic idealism then represented in the United
States by Emerson at Harvard. 72 These two defeats were ideological
turning points in American thought, the effects of which are still felt.
VII.
In concluding this consideration of the nature of the Louisiana
Digest of 1808 as bourgeois or as feudal it is necessary to reiterate the
importance of a social structural or mobile-conception of the Digest of
1808, whether or not the formulated texts may be feudal. In his Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel said that the rationalist enlightenment or
illumination was a bourgeois plundering or appropriative alienation of
medieval. faith or-fideism, the history of which was a development,
through negations, from the rationalism of philosophically idealist
natural law ultimately into utilitarianism. He said that
71. Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Transaction: "La Possession Vaut
Titre" and "Bona Fide" Purchase,6 TUL. L. REv. 589-612 (1932).
72. 2 DYNNIK, GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE 520 (1960).
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[e]nlightenment illuminates that world of heaven with ideas drawn
from the world of sense, pointing out there this element of finitude
which belief cannot deny or repudiate, because it is self-consciousness,
and in being so is the unity to which both kinds of ideas belong, and
in which they do not fall apart from one another; for they belong to
the same indivisible simple self into which belief has passed, and
which constitutes its life.
Belief has by this means lost the content which furnished its filling,
and collapses into an inarticulate state where the spirit works and
weaves within itself. Belief is banished from its own kingdom; this
kingdom is sacked and plundered, since the waking consciousness has
forcibly taken to itself every distinction and expansion of it and
claimed every one of its parts for earth, and returned them to the
earth that owns them. Yet belief is not on that account satisfied, for
this illumination has everywhere brought to light only what is individual, with the result that only insubstantial
realities and finitude for73
saken of spirit make any appeal to spirit.
73. G. HEGEL,
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(2d ed. J. Baillie transl. 1931).

